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a b s t r a c t 
Machine learning classiﬁcation algorithms are widely applied to different malware analysis problems be- 
cause of their proven abilities to learn from examples and perform relatively well with little human input. 
Use cases include the labelling of malicious samples according to families during triage of suspected mal- 
ware. However, automated algorithms are vulnerable to attacks. An attacker could carefully manipulate 
the sample to force the algorithm to produce a particular output. In this paper we discuss one such at- 
tack on Android malware classiﬁers. We design and implement a prototype tool, called IagoDroid, that 
takes as input a malware sample and a target family, and modiﬁes the sample to cause it to be classi- 
ﬁed as belonging to this family while preserving its original semantics. Our technique relies on a search 
process that generates variants of the original sample without modifying their semantics. We tested Iago- 
Droid against RevealDroid, a recent, open source, Android malware classiﬁer based on a variety of static 
features. IagoDroid successfully forces misclassiﬁcation for 28 of the 29 representative malware families 
present in the DREBIN dataset. Remarkably, it does so by modifying just a single feature of the origi- 
nal malware. On average, it ﬁnds the ﬁrst evasive sample in the ﬁrst search iteration, and converges to 
a 100% evasive population within 4 iterations. Finally, we introduce RevealDroid ∗ , a more robust classi- 
ﬁer that implements several techniques proposed in other adversarial learning domains. Our experiments 
suggest that RevealDroid ∗ can correctly detect up to 99% of the variants generated by IagoDroid. 
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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0. Introduction 
Detecting and classifying malware is a challenge that has
teadily increased over time. Not only has the rate of produc-
ion of distinct ﬁles been increasing but the methods used to
vade detection have become more sophisticated. For instance,
alicious apps have been observed colluding to achieve their
esired outcomes ( Labs, 2016; Zhou & Jiang, 2012 ). The quan-
ity of malware targeting mobile devices doubled in the year
o July 2016 ( Labs, 2016 ), with a clear trend towards the reuse
f source code instead of developing new variants from scratch
 Zhou & Jiang, 2012 ). Mobile malware variants are produced
hrough component reuse and also via obfuscation. Considering
he advances in machine learning techniques in the last decades,
here is widespread interest in applying these to the malware∗ Corresponding author. 
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957-4174/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article uriage problem. Contemporary machine learning algorithms pro-
ide the potential to improve scalability and offer high ﬂexibility
egarding the features employed during the classiﬁcation of mal-
are into families ( Dash et al., 2016; Gandotra, Bansal, & Sofat,
014 ). However, an informed adversary can deliberately alter the
ecision process of an automated classiﬁer by different means.
he problem of employing machine learning algorithms in ad-
ersarial environments has previously been studied in security
elated contexts such as spam, intrusion detection, or malware
lassiﬁcation ( Biggio, Rieck et al., 2014; Dalvi, Domingos, Sanghai,
 Verma, 2004; Lowd & Meek, 2005 ). In the same way, different
ountermeasures have been proposed ( Biggio, Corona, Fumera,
iacinto, & Roli, 2011; Chinavle, Kolari, Oates, & Finin, 2009 ). 
This paper investigates the automated disruption of An-
roid malware triage, the process by which decisions are
ade in regard to the further analysis steps for a suspicious
le ( Chakradeo, Reaves, Traynor, & Enck, 2013 ). A critical step dur-
ng this process, that may affect the choice of subsequent analysis
echniques, is the identiﬁcation of the malware family of a highly
uspicious ﬁle. Our attack is that a malware writer, in deployingnder the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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s  variants from a relatively novel family, attempts to disguise them
as a different family, one that is less likely to attract intensive
scrutiny. This may hide novel indicators of compromise such as
DNS records, malicious URLs, or exploits ( Lakhotia, Walenstein,
Miles, & Singh, 2013 ). 
In this scenario, the power of the malware writer or adversary
is as follows: she has control over her malware sample and is
able to extract static features such as intents-actions, API calls,
and information ﬂows. In addition, she knows the feature space
used by the targeted classiﬁer and has access to the classiﬁ-
cation/misclassiﬁcation probability. This is a relatively strong
assumption, yet the attacker still has the limitation of not knowing
the underlying classiﬁcation algorithm and she needs to preserve
the semantics of the executable. Besides, she wants to automate
the process. Our solution to this problem, a tool called IagoDroid,
uses evolutionary algorithms to perform a search that identiﬁes
a minimal number of changes to the features in order to effect a
family misclassiﬁcation. IagoDroid can randomly choose a family
or target a speciﬁc family. 
Assuming further knowledge about the classiﬁer is unrealistic
in practice. Since the mapping (from vectors to labels) imple-
mented by the classiﬁer is unknown, there is no other option
but to treat it as a black box that can be repeatedly queried
during search. Even when this is not the case and the details
about the classiﬁer are fully known, obtaining an actionable
analytical description of such a mapping might not be always
possible, particularly for non-linear classiﬁers that capture com-
plex interactions among features to produce the output label.
Population-based search mechanisms such as genetic algorithms
have proven to perform remarkably well in challenging domains
where more traditional search algorithms have not succeeded
( Sivanandam & Deepa, 2007 ). 
Attacks against classiﬁers have been discussed before, both
from a theoretical point of view and in particular security domains
such as spam or intrusion detection. In this paper we study the
impact of an attack against multiclass Android malware classiﬁers.
Android apps are extremely easy to decompile, manipulate and
repackage again into a new app. This makes it easy to introduce
new artefacts (e.g., components, API calls, intents, information
ﬂows) in the app that will affect its associated feature vector and,
therefore, the label given by a classiﬁer. If carefully introduced
(for instance, in if-then blocks only accessible through an opaque
predicate that always evaluates to false), such modiﬁcations will
not affect the app’s execution semantics. 
To demonstrate our approach, IagoDroid attacks family clas-
siﬁcation by RevealDroid ( Garcia, Hammad, Pedrood, Bagheri-
Khaligh, & Malek, 2015 ), a recently proposed malware classiﬁer
employing existing static analysis features. Our choice of Reveal-
Droid is for convenience (it is open source and ready to use) and
because it incorporates most of the static features discussed in
the literature (API calls, information ﬂows, and so on). However,
IagoDroid is agnostic with respect to the classiﬁer used and can
be applied to different classiﬁers. Moreover, we have subsequently
designed a countermeasure that can detect when a potential
evasion has been performed and can recover a set of potential
original families. 
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows: 
• We propose a novel classiﬁcation evasion attack against any
triage process where the family classiﬁcation relies on static
analysis. We demonstrate, in particular, that IagoDroid can
evade an open source classiﬁer named RevealDroid , a freely
available multi-class malware classiﬁer which combines several
different features. To do so, we employ evolutionary algorithms,
a technique which has been previously employed in the contextof evading classiﬁers for security applications ( Pastrana, Orﬁla,
& Ribagorda, 2011; Xu, Qi, & Evans, 2016 ) (see Section 2 ). 
• We train RevealDroid using 1919 malware samples from the
DREBIN ( Arp, Spreitzenbarth, Hubner, Gascon, & Rieck, 2014 )
dataset divided into 29 different malware families. IagoDroid
successfully forces misclassiﬁcation of 28 of the 29 families, in
the process modifying only a single feature of the original mal-
ware feature vector. On average, IagoDroid is able to ﬁnd the
ﬁrst evasive ﬁle within the ﬁrst generation and converges on a
100% evasive population within 4 generations (see Section 4 ).
It was able to ﬁnd approximately 14,0 0 0 evasive variants from
more than 290 initial malware samples within 2 min. 
• The countermeasure, named by us as RevealDroid ∗, detects
potential evasions in between 90% and 99% of the output
of IagoDroid, depending on the number of modiﬁcations in-
troduced, and can identify potential original families for the
malware (see Section 5 ). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 ,
e present our approach, introducing issues related to our
ontribution such as the adopted adversarial model, the target
lassiﬁer, and the parameters of the genetic algorithm compo-
ent. Section 3 describes the experiments and our conﬁguration
f them. In Section 4 we analyse and discuss the results while
ection 5 describes the countermeasure proposed. Section 6 in-
roduces the most relevant, related contributions found in the
iterature and ﬁnally Section 7 concludes the paper. 
. IagoDroid 
This section describes IagoDroid, a prototype tool that induces
islabelling of malware families during the triaging process for
otential malware samples. Given the importance of automated
ystems to detect and classify malware, to understand how these
ystems can fail (and how can they be strengthened) when attacks
re directed against their integrity is an important task. Iago-
roid’s main goal is to demonstrate that an attack on an Android
alware classiﬁcation tool is feasible, by forcing it to produce a
amily misclassiﬁcation as the result of some minor changes in the
riginal sample and without modifying its semantics. 
Following the taxonomy of attacks on machine learning de-
eloped by Barreno, Nelson, Sears, Joseph, and Tygar (2006) , our
pproach can be positioned as follows: 
• Exploratory Attacks: The attack described in this paper is ex-
ploratory since it does not aim at altering the training process
but the classiﬁcation itself, oﬄine. 
• Targeted Attacks: Regarding speciﬁcity, the proposed attack
is focused on misleading the label given by the classiﬁer to a
particular sample. Nevertheless, the use of evolutionary search
to ﬁnd a proper mutation strategy can be used to fool the
detection of any sample in the dataset as demonstrated in the
following sections of the paper. 
• Integrity Attacks: In contrast to attacks against the availability
of the classiﬁer, we do not seek to induce random classiﬁcation
errors. We aim to coerce an intended family misclassiﬁcation
for speciﬁc input samples. 
The basic idea behind the IagoDroid attack is that the feature
ector of a malicious application can be transformed by injecting
ew speciﬁc, incremental values, and this can eventually result
n the assignment of an incorrect family label. These changes
n the feature vector require modiﬁcations in the app’s code
nd resources, in order to build a new sample corresponding to
he desired feature vector. For instance, it may be necessary to
nclude a new API call. Moreover, these changes are made while
imultaneously keeping the semantics of the app invariant. The
A. Calleja et al. / Expert Systems With Applications 95 (2018) 113–126 115 
Fig. 1. General scheme of IagoDroid. 
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v  ey to achieving semantic invariance is to only consider small,
ncremental changes in the app (i.e., adding new API calls or new
ermissions) each of which does not alter the original semantics. 
Obtaining the list of transformations to apply to the feature
ector can be seen as a search problem in which a search heuristic
nds a solution (i.e., a new feature vector) based on the proximity
f the current feature vector to one associated with a label differ-
nt from the current one. This proximity can be calculated based
n the output of a malware classiﬁer, by measuring the probability
f the feature vector being classiﬁed as the original label or as a
ifferent label. 
Fig. 1 shows the general architecture of IagoDroid. There are
wo main pipelines, one depicted above the other. The upper
ipeline shows the process of building the classiﬁcation algorithm
sed to drive the heuristic search. This algorithm takes as input
 set of samples placed in a feature space. These samples are
mployed to train the classiﬁer and obtain a classiﬁcation model.
n the other hand, the process of performing the attack is shown
n the bottom pipeline. In this case the process starts by picking a
alware sample whose family label we wish to alter. Additionally,
he attack pipeline can also take a target family (see Section 2.1 ).
agoDroid employs a genetic algorithm to perform the heuristic
earch, as these algorithms to adapt to problems of high com-
lexity. The search is guided by a ﬁtness function which uses the
lassiﬁcation model previously trained to ﬁnd the solutions that in-
uce misclassiﬁcation. Finally, the application is modiﬁed in order
o adapt it to its new feature vector and it is repackaged to obtain
 new app which is able to evade a correct family classiﬁcation. 
The following subsections present the context for IagoDroid,
tarting from a description of the adversarial model, a speci-
cation of the target classiﬁer and ﬁnishing with the problem
ormalisation. 
.1. Adversarial model 
In our scenario, we consider an adversary who aims to evade
he correct classiﬁcation of a sample belonging to family A by
isclassifying it as family B . 
The goal of the adversary is to ensure that it is possible to miss
he identiﬁcation of the correct family. We consider two cases. In
he ﬁrst scenario, the selection of the target family is delegated
o the evolutionary algorithm which will merely try to change the
abel of the input feature vector with the minimum number of
hanges. In the second scenario, the target family is also an input
nd the search will attempt to ﬁnd the feature changes that attain
his speciﬁc misclassiﬁcation. 
As introduced in Section 1 , the adversary seeks to thwart the
eployment of proper countermeasures. To appreciate how thettacker achieves this, it is useful to specify what the adversary
nows about the classiﬁer. Given that IagoDroid is based on a
ell known classiﬁcation algorithm whose source code is publicly
vailable, we allow the feature set employed by the classiﬁer to be
nown to the attacker. We assume the attacker is able to create
ew feature vectors and submit them directly to the classiﬁer
ithout any constraint. We assume that the classiﬁer interacts
ith the submitted feature vectors as if they had been extracted
rom applications created or modiﬁed by the adversary. In other
ords, the search is conducted at the feature vector level, without
irectly modifying the malware sample until a solution is found. 
Regarding the classiﬁer output, the attacker receives two val-
es: the label assigned to the input vector and a classiﬁcation
core, indicating the trust/reliability of the classiﬁcation. Since
he adversary is able to deploy her own implementation of the
lassiﬁer, we do not consider any limitation in the number of
eature vectors that can be submitted, hence the attacker has
n unbounded number of attempts to lead the classiﬁer to a
ompromised verdict. 
This scenario for the adversarial capabilities is realistic since
he target classiﬁer can be well documented (i.e., no security
hrough obscurity) or else reversed. 
.2. Target classiﬁer 
We decided to use an already proposed and documented
lassiﬁer in our work. Our selection criteria for choosing a target
lassiﬁer included good classiﬁer precision and high diversity in
he features it uses. While there are several classiﬁers discussed
n the literature, few of them consider an important and represen-
ative set of features and are freely available to download. Table 1
ompares the use of different features by the most important
lassiﬁers described in the literature and notes whether they can
e downloaded to be used for our purposes. From the nine anal-
sed proposals, only the authors of three of them have released
he source code of their solutions, RevealDroid , Dendroid and
roidLegacy . Of these, RevealDroid is the most appropriate
ne since it uses the widest set of features. In addition, it was
esigned and tested for malware family classiﬁcation. 
evealDroid classiﬁer building 
RevealDroid consists of a series of components that enable
he extraction of three different kinds of data from Android apps:
PI calls, intent actions, and streams and ﬂows. These features can
e used to build a dataset and then to train a machine learning
lgorithm to perform a classiﬁcation task that predicts the family
abel of previously unseen samples. Each group of features is
xtracted separately and is sequentially added to the feature
ector for each application, with the objective of controlling and
116 A. Calleja et al. / Expert Systems With Applications 95 (2018) 113–126 
Table 1 
Android malware classiﬁcation methods using machine learning approaches. 
Classiﬁer Code structures Permissions Api Calls Intent-actions Flow analysis Tested for families 
classiﬁcation 
Freely available to 
download 
RevealDroid ( Garcia et al., 2015 ) ✗ ✗ √ √ √ √ √ 
DroidSIFT ( Zhang et al., 2014 ) ✗ √ √ √ √ ✗ ✗ 
Dendroid ( Suarez-Tangil et al., 2014 ) 
√ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ √ √ 
Drebin ( Arp et al., 2014 ) ✗ √ √ √ ✗ √ ✗ 
DroidMiner ( Yang et al., 2014 ) ✗ ✗ √ √ ✗ √ ✗ 
DroidAPIMiner ( Aafer et al., 2013 ) ✗ ✗ √ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
VILO ( Lakhotia et al., 2013 ) 
√ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ √ ✗ 
DroidLegacy ( Deshotels et al., 2014 ) ✗ ✗ √ ✗ ✗ √ √ 
MAST ( Chakradeo et al., 2013 ) 
√ √ ✗ √ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
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 supervising the whole process. We used the original code of
RevealDroid , downloaded from its public repository. 1 
The ﬁrst feature extracted from each application is a list of the
API calls found in the code, which allows one to obtain a high
level description of the expected behaviour of the application.
These API calls can be included in the feature vector of an app
in two ways: grouping the calls by using the 30 security-sensitive
API categories deﬁned by Rasthofer, Arzt, and Bodden (2014) , or
grouping the calls by using the Android package in which they are
deﬁned. Revealdroid follows this second approach. 
The second step of the dataset building process consists of
including intent actions data. Intent actions are identiﬁers of
different events that happen within the lifecycle of an application
such as launching a new activity or a new service. This is also a
useful information source for detecting and classifying malicious
applications ( Chin, Felt, Greenwood, & Wagner, 2011 ). 
Thirdly, RevealDroid uses information ﬂows to characterise
the samples. An information ﬂow can be seen as the path followed
by a piece of sensitive data through the ﬂow graph of a program.
In this case, an information ﬂow is represented as a pair consisting
of a source (i.e. an API call providing data to the app) and a sink
(i.e. the app providing data as input for another API call). 
The ﬁnal step involves the training process of a machine
learning classiﬁcation algorithm. The authors of RevealDroid use a
decision tree based algorithm, C4.5, and the 1-nearest neighbour
algorithm. Nevertheless, any other machine learning algorithm
might be used instead. 
2.3. Problem formalisation 
In this subsection we provide a formal description of the attack.
Our experimental dataset can be formalised as the set X ,
containing samples of different malware families. However, since
we are solely interested in the feature vectors describing different
properties of each sample, X can be represented as the set of n
feature vectors: 
X = { x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n } . (1)
Each feature vector x i is composed of k different features, extracted
directly from the original application: 
x i = { x 1 i , x 2 i , . . . , x k i } . (2)
Initially, each sample in the dataset is labelled with the name
of the family it belongs to. We name the set of all the possible
labels in the dataset as Y . Thus, the classiﬁer C can be deﬁned as
a function mapping a feature vector x i ∈ X to the most likely label
y j ∈ Y , paired with its probability of being the correct label: 
(x i ) = (p(y j ) , y j ) , y j ∈ Y, (3)
where p ( y j ) is the probability of y j being the true label of x i as
estimated by the classiﬁer. 1 https://bitbucket.org/joshuaga/revealdroid . 
w  
f  
tFinally, we formalise our search approach at a high level of
bstraction as a function accepting two arguments: a feature
ector which is to be misclassiﬁed, obtained from the app, and the
riginal label that we want to avoid. The output of this function
 x ′ 
i 
) will be the original vector with a set of changes (e.g., incre-
ent the value of a feature) to be applied to the original feature
ector x i . Once this new vector has been created, the classiﬁer C
ill assign a new label y ′ 
j 
to this modiﬁed vector: 
agoDroid (x i , y j ) = x ′ i : y ′ j ∈ Y, y ′ j  = y j . (4)
e consider the changes as a  vector satisfying: x i +  = x ′ i . 
.4. Genetic approach 
This section describes the design details of the genetic algo-
ithm that is at the core of IagoDroid. 
.4.1. Encoding 
Each individual I i present in the evolutionary process is de-
igned to represent a possible new feature vector x ′ 
i 
containing k
ifferent f eatures or genes. Since the goal of IagoDroid is to intro-
uce modiﬁcations in the feature vector so that the associated app
ets misclassiﬁed while preserving its semantics, the individual’s
ncoding is designed to only allow incremental changes in each
eature. Thus, the individual starts with the same feature vector as
he sample received as input x i . Once the minimum value of each
ene I 
j 
i 
of the individuals is established, it is also necessary to ﬁx a
aximum threshold MT to limit the number of changes and facili-
ate their implementation. Then, [ x i , x i + MT ] is the range for each
ene in each individual I i . This restriction on the values of each
ndividual will be present through the entire evolutionary process. 
.4.2. Genetic operators 
Four operators are in charge of driving the evolutionary process
cross a number of generations. The selection operator is elitist,
icking the n best individuals in each generation to be part of
he next generation. Reproduction is performed by means of a
tandard tournament operator. For crossover we opt for a uniform
perator and, lastly, a random mutation operator is used to in-
roduce diversity in the population by changing the value of some
enes randomly (within the ranges speciﬁed above). 
.4.3. Fitness function 
The ﬁtness function uses the gradient of the classiﬁer output
score) to guide the genetic search. Speciﬁcally it uses the proba-
ility of the class that the algorithm wants to avoid. This can be
ormally deﬁned as: 
f (x i , y j ) = 
{
1 − p(y j ) if (p(y j ) , y j ) = C(x i ) 
1 otherwise 
(5)
here x i is the feature vector of the application, y j indicates its
amily and p represents the probability assigned to the classiﬁca-
ion. 
A. Calleja et al. / Expert Systems With Applications 95 (2018) 113–126 117 
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p  .5. Targeting speciﬁc families 
The approach described so far addresses a genetic search
eeking to reach different malware families, providing an effective
echnique to hide the real family of a malicious application. How-
ver, the search has no control over the ﬁnal family label that will
e assigned to the modiﬁed sample. This represents an interesting
ssue, since an attacker might well wish to target speciﬁc families
ith different purposes (for instance, to force defenders to deploy
peciﬁc incorrect countermeasures). To address this issue, the
tness function can be easily modiﬁed to guide the search to
ndividuals representing feature vectors classiﬁed as a given target
amily. The new ﬁtness function is as follows: 
f (x i , y k ) = 
{
p(y k ) if C(x i )  = (p(y k ) , y k ) 
1 otherwise 
(6)
here y k represents the target family label. 
. Experimentation 
We next discuss the experiments that we have performed
o validate our proposal. The experiments address the following
esearch questions: 
• RQ1: How much effort does it take to ﬁnd the modiﬁcations
needed to misclassify a particular sample? 
• RQ2: Which features are more often involved when modifying a
sample? 
• RQ3: Given a malware family, is the cost of forcing misclassiﬁca-
tion errors in its samples constant for all possible target families
or are some families easier to target than others? 
Our main goal is to provide evidence that our approach can
nduce a misclassiﬁcation error in a targeted malware classi-
er. Accordingly, the experiments discussed in this section have
een executed using only the ﬁrst ﬁtness function presented in
ection 2.4.3 and we did not direct the genetic search towards a
articular family classiﬁcation. The rest of this section describes
he experimental setting, including the dataset, classiﬁers and pa-
ameters used. To facilitate the reproducibility of our experiments,
e have created open source versions of our implementation,
ataset and scripts used throughout this work 2 . 
.1. Dataset 
We tested our approach using the DREBIN dataset ( Arp et al.,
014 ). This dataset contains 5560 malicious Android apps classiﬁed
nto 179 different families. Unfortunately, the number of samples
er family is not balanced, resulting in some families with a low
umber of samples (e.g., 47 families contain just 1 sample). We
herefore removed all classes containing less than 10 samples,
esulting in a ﬁnal dataset composed of 5198 samples distributed
n 54 different families. 
We then leveraged a number of existing tools to extract the
eatures from each sample in the dataset. API calls and intent ac-
ions were obtained using Androguard 3 , a fairly well known static
nalysis tool. To extract information ﬂows we used FlowDroid
 Arzt et al., 2014 ), a taint analysis tool that ﬁnds source-sink con-
ections. FlowDroid can be tuned through different parameters
o maximise either performance or precision. We set parameters
o achieve as much precision as possible. This approach differs
lightly from the procedure followed by other works that have2 The dataset is available at https://data.mendeley.com/datasets/4sksrpm5vj/1 
nd the code at https://github.com/hdg7/IagoDroid . 
3 https://github.com/androguard/androguard 
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s  
p  enerally aimed at maximising performance by compromising
recision (e.g., Garcia et al., 2015 ). Using FlowDroid to extract in-
ormation ﬂows introduces two important issues. First, the time it
akes to analyse a single app ranges from a few minutes to several
ours in the worst case. Furthermore, it unexpectedly crashes for
any apps. These two issues (scalability and stability) forced us
o dramatically reduce the number of samples actually used in
he experiments. Thus, from the original set of 5189 samples, only
919 samples belonging to 29 different families were successfully
rocessed by FlowDroid . 
Finally, once the ﬁnal dataset was built, we carried out a basic
ovariance analysis among the features to remove those that did
ot provide any additional information. 
.2. Target classiﬁer 
To demonstrate our approach, we relied on RevealDroid ,
n Android malware classiﬁer that uses various static features
nd allows the use of different machine learning classiﬁcation
lgorithms. While the original authors used C4.5 and 1-NN, we
estricted ourselves to C4.5 since it showed better accuracy and
recision. Nevertheless, our approach is not limited to a particular
lassiﬁcation algorithm and should work with any other classiﬁca-
ion approach. The C4.5 algorithm was trained using the RWeka
ackage for R , keeping its default parameters. We use 2/3 of the
ata for training combined with 10 cross-fold validation and the
emaining 1/3 for testing. The testing accuracy is 88% averaged
ver 50 runs. 
.3. Genetic search 
The genetic algorithm was conﬁgured using the following pa-
ameters: a mutation probability of 0.1; a crossover probability of
.8; population size equal to 50; maximum number of generations
qual to 20; elitism parameter of 3; and a maximum number of
ransformations per allele of 1 (though we set an increment that
rovides a transformation probability per allele ranging from 0.6
o 1). 
.4. Attack steps 
This subsection discusses the sequence of steps followed by an
ttacker to force the missclassiﬁcation of a particular sample. Re-
all ( Section 2.1 ) that we assume an adversary with full knowledge
nd unlimited access to the classiﬁer. 
The ﬁrst step is to extract the features from the malicious sam-
les that will be eventually mutated. Androguard and FlowDroid
xtract these features and generate the feature vector x i . This fea-
ure vector provides a basis for the genetic search. Since the aim
f the attacker is to change the ﬁnal label of the sample without
ltering its functionality, the way in which the components of
his vector may be modiﬁed during the search is restricted. For
nstance, if a particular API call is used in the original sample, the
utated sample must keep this feature (i.e., if the component of
his API call is set to 1 in the original vector it cannot be set to 0).
therwise the semantics of the application will be altered and the
alicious behaviour will not be preserved. The genetic algorithm
akes this into account and only mutates these features by adding
dditional intent actions, API calls or information ﬂows, without
emoving any of the original values . Under this premise, the search
rocess generates new individuals by evolving the previous genera-
ion. On each iteration, the ﬁtness function evaluates for every sin-
le individual whether the correct classiﬁcation has been evaded. 
Once a solution is found, the attacker applies the mutation
trategy found by the genetic search to the original malware sam-
le. This will require adding a combination of new intent actions,
118 A. Calleja et al. / Expert Systems With Applications 95 (2018) 113–126 
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t  API calls, and/or new information ﬂows. To alter the original APK
ﬁle, the attacker ﬁrst decompresses it to access the ﬁles packed
inside, such as the manifest or the DEX ﬁle(s). Adding a new
intent action, API call or information ﬂow requires disassembling
the original DEX ﬁle, which contains the bytecode responsible
for the app’s functionality and is generated at compilation time
from the original Java source code. There are several tools to carry
out this process. Smali and Backsmali 4 are well known tools
for translating the Dalvik bytecode contained the DEX ﬁle into
human readable (smali) code. The result of disassembling a DEX
ﬁle using these tools is a set of ﬁles related to the original Java
sources. These ﬁles can easily be modiﬁed by the attacker to add
a new call to an Android API method or a new intent action. To
avoid introducing undesirable extra functionality into the app, the
attacker can put the newly added code blocks within conditional
sentences (i.e., if-then) driven by opaque predicates that always
evaluate to false. This would prevent optimizers from removing
them while achieving the two-fold goals of having those features
in the code but not executing them. Once the new elements
have been added to the code, the process can be reversed using
Backsmali to repackage the APK ﬁle. 
Unlike API calls or intent actions, information ﬂows are related
to the execution paths of the program. This means that a particular
information ﬂow will only be detected if it happens as part of the
instructions that are actually executed when the app runs. This is
a consequence of the way in which taint analysis tools based on
symbolic execution, such as FlowDroid , explore the application to
ﬁnd possible data ﬂows, building the application ﬂow graph and
following all the possible paths within the application. To insert
a new information ﬂow the attacker needs to place it within a
method that will be eventually called. Android apps implement
several callbacks (such as those used for managing the life-cycle
of activities and services) to interact with different events taking
place in the operating system. Thus, ﬁnding pieces of code that
will certainly be executed is not diﬃcult. To add a new informa-
tion ﬂow, the attacker can follow the procedure described above
for intent actions and API calls. 
We have manually tested the attacks with one of the samples
in our dataset. Speciﬁcally, we modiﬁed an app labelled as a
member of the Plankton family and, after altering it according
to the found mutation strategy, the classiﬁer misclassiﬁed it as
a member of the BaseBridge family. Achieving misclassiﬁcation
only required the addition of a single intent action (ACTION INPUT
METHOD CHANGED). After following the previously described
steps, we examined the app and extracted the new feature vector.
This new vector contains the feature ACTION INPUT METHOD
CHANGED along with the original features of the app, showing
that the modiﬁcation step worked as expected while keeping the
original features unchanged. Finally, we ran the classiﬁer over this
sample and obtained the wrong label (BaseBridge) as expected. 
4. Results 
We next discuss our experimental results. The experiments aim
to provide answers to the three research questions introduced
in the previous section. All the experiments were executed on a
cluster of 6 nodes, each node equipped with 24 cores and 128Gb
of RAM memory. 
We took a random subset, selected uniformly across families,
of samples from our main dataset for the experiments. This subset
was composed of 290 samples, taking 10 samples per family from
29 different families. As we mentioned above, there are families4 https://github.com/JesusFreke/smali 
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t  hat only have 10 samples, hence the need to pick at most 10 apps
er family to balance the ﬁnal sample. 
.1. Evasion effort 
The ﬁrst research question aims to measure the effort required
y the attacker to ﬁnd a mutation strategy that induces a clas-
iﬁcation error. We attempt to answer this question from three
ifferent points of view: (i) the number of generations required by
he search to achieve evasion (i.e., to ﬁnd a single individual evad-
ng the correct classiﬁcation) and convergence (a whole generation
vading correct classiﬁcation); (ii) the number of modiﬁcations in
he feature vector required; and (iii) the number of queries to the
lassiﬁer (this is correlated with the ﬁrst perspective but it is a
tandard metric in evasion environments ( Biggio et al., 2013 )). 
Table 3 summarizes the results for the experiments carried out.
t shows how many generations were enough to achieve evasion
nd at which point the genetic search converges (i.e., all individu-
ls being misclassiﬁed). Remarkably, a solution is found in the ﬁrst
eneration for all families but BaseBridge. This means that a single
teration of the genetic algorithm is required to evade the correct
lassiﬁcation of a single sample. This achievement suggests that
he search effort is low and the search might be replaced by a sim-
le analytical process consisting on adding changes to the features
i.e., adding API calls, or intents among others). As a sanity check,
e analysed this possibility considering transformations from a
ingle sample of a speciﬁc family to another (in this case, from
inMaster to DroidKungFu). The analytical process can only add
hanges. However, all possible transformations from the vectors
f GinMaster to vectors of DroidKungFu require subtractions. This
ould change the app semantics. Considering only those features
hat can be added, the analytical process requires between 500 and
6,0 0 0 changes from the original to the target vector. Using the
ame samples, the GA found solutions with only one change. 
The average number of generations required to achieve conver-
ence is around 4 for all families. Notable deviations include Droid-
ungFu, whose samples require around 7 generations, and SMSreg
ith less than 2 generations. This demonstrates that the evasion
echnique is extremely eﬃcient against the classiﬁer for the fam-
lies tested. The only family whose samples cannot be successfully
utated so as to be classiﬁed as some other family is BaseBridge. A
areful analysis of the results and the classiﬁer’s inner working for
his family shows that samples with this label have a strong cor-
elation with the ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGE feature. Every
ime this feature is present, the sample is classiﬁed as belonging to
aseBridge. Since the semantics preserving rules prevent us from
emoving any features, this poses a clear limitation on the attack. 
The total amount of time taken for these experiments using the
ample subset of 290 individuals is around 2 min. Within this time
pan, the search found 14,0 0 0 mutation strategies able to evade
he classiﬁer. This number can be broken down into 50 different
utation strategies for 280 individuals (omitting the ten individu-
ls that belong to the BaseBridge family). This gives us interesting
nformation about the performance of the attack and demonstrates
ow easy it is to evade a malware classiﬁer such as RevealDroid . 
To discover the minimum number of modiﬁcations needed to
chieve misclassiﬁcation, we set the change probability to the min-
mum value (0.6). The results are shown in Table 3 . In this case,
e selected malware samples uniformly from the whole dataset,
onsidering a realistic scenario in which an attacker would employ
ifferent malware samples without any previous knowledge about
heir classiﬁcations. In this scenario, some samples were then
isclassiﬁed by RevealDroid , showing that no modiﬁcation is
eeded to evade it. 
In almost all cases the average number of modiﬁcations is close
o 1. This means that the evasion technique only needs to modify
A. Calleja et al. / Expert Systems With Applications 95 (2018) 113–126 119 
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Fig. 2. Most frequent classiﬁcation errors between families induced during the 
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ﬁ single feature in order to evade classiﬁcation, revealing how
ragile malware classiﬁers such as RevealDroid are. In order to
xplore this case in more depth, Section 4.2 studies the impact of
he different features during the misclassiﬁcation attack. 
Finally, the number of queries to the classiﬁer during the evo-
ution depends on the number of generations and the population
ize. In each generation a single query is executed for each sample
n the population. Since our approach only needs one generation
o succeed, 50 queries are needed per sample. This number is
igher if we require the convergence of the whole population, as
eeds up to 350 queries ( 7 × 50 ) in the worst case. 
RQ1 . Our results show that misclassification can be achieved 
in just one generation of the genetic search. This translates to 
a number of queries to the classifier ranging from 50 to 350 per 
sample. Furthermore, only one mutation is needed to induce 
a misclassification error for most samples. 
.2. Relevant features for the attack 
In order to understand which features are more related to a
articular family, we performed an analysis of the most relevant
eatures affected during the mutation process. We followed the
ame approach as in the experiments discussed in Section 4.1 ,
here only one feature is needed to change the family classiﬁ-
ation. Table 3 shows the feature that is changed most often and
he overall probability for this feature to be modiﬁed during the
earch. 
The feature most frequently added is AC-
ION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED. As we mentioned above, this
eature is tightly coupled with the BaseBridge family, in such a
ay that whenever it is added to the feature vector, the sample is
lassiﬁed as belonging to BaseBridge. 
ACTION_USER_PRESENT is another feature that is present in
he modiﬁcations, especially for families such as Kmin, Steek,
zhc and Fatakr. These families are closely related to remote
erver connections (Kmin and Yzhc) and sending SMS messages
Steek and Fatakr) containing private information, so they do not
ecessarily focus on user actions. 
RQ2 . The feature ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED is 
used most often due to its close relationship with the Base- 
Bridge family. ACTION_USER_PRESENT is used next often, 
appearing in four families with a common behaviour (leaking 
information from the device). 
.3. Transition between families during evasion 
The ﬁnal experiment attempts to measure the diﬃculty of
utating samples from each family to each potential target family.
o do this, we measured the most commonly changing patterns
mong the different families during the search. Fig. 2 depicts a
robabilistic representation of the most frequent changes between
amilies. Unsurprisingly, BaseBridge is the family to which samples
re most commonly reclassiﬁed. This is related to our previous
nalysis in Section 4.2 , which showed that any sample with the
eature ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED set to one is classiﬁed
s belonging to BaseBridge regardless of any other features. 
Some interesting relationships can be found, such as the one
etween Plankton and Nyleaker, which share almost the same
ntent actions, Plankton having a couple of actions more than
yleaker. Kmin and GinMaster have a close relationship withroidKungFu: a single modiﬁcation of a ﬂow based on MMS
Kmin) or the ACTION_USER_PRESENT feature (GinMaster) causes
he original sample to be classiﬁed as belonging to DroidKungFu.
 similar case happens with Fatakr and Nandrobox, in which a
ingle modiﬁcation of the ACTION_USER_PRESENT feature causes a
isclassiﬁcation. 
Interestingly, the matrix shown in Fig. 2 is asymmetric. This
eans that samples from family A can be mutated into samples of
amily B but the inverse process was not found possible during the
earch. The only cases in which both mutations are possible are
lankton and DroidKungFu, DroidKungFu and Kmin, and Adrd and
roidKungFu. This suggests that DroidKungFu is a heterogeneous
amily. Finally, we note that there are 9 families that can never be
argets: GinMaster, Nyleaker, Geinimi, Imlog, ExploitLinuxLotoor, 
sider, Yzhc, FakeRun and Hamob. This is a consequence of how
he classiﬁer builds the classiﬁcation model, keeping some families
ounded to speciﬁc feature ranges that are modiﬁed during the
volution process. 
RQ3 . The effort required to mutate a sample from an original 
classification to classification as a target family depends on 
both families, with some mutations being impossible. 
. A countermeasure 
The results discussed in the previous section demonstrate that
t is generally possible (and in fact easy) to cause a misclassiﬁca-
ion error in a typical Android malware classiﬁer. This is ultimately
ccomplished by injecting additional artefacts into the sample,
uch as new API calls or intents, that will affect the feature vector
ssociated with the app. 
We next discuss how such attacks can be countered through
he use of a more robust classiﬁer. Our proposal ﬁrst aims at
etecting potential attack cases (i.e., samples deliberately modiﬁed
o as to induce a classiﬁcation error) and then at backtracking
he changes to identify potential source families. Both strategies
onstitute variations of ideas proposed before in the ﬁeld of adver-
arial machine learning ( Chinavle et al., 2009 ). However, this is the
rst countermeasure discussing the ability to backtrack the attack. 
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Fig. 3. Countermeasure schema including RevealDroid ∗ . 
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c  5.1. Detecting potential misclassiﬁcations 
The result of an attack, such as the one shown in this paper, is
an app modiﬁed in a way that will deceive a classiﬁcation system,
causing it to return an incorrect family label. The underlying
causes for such an error are related to the manner in which the
algorithm at the core of the classiﬁer works. In the case of Re-
vealDroid , each alteration introduced in the application translates
into features that will change the path followed along the decision
tree, thus driving the output to a different leaf and, therefore, a
different label. 
In order to detect potential attempts to evade the classiﬁer, we
propose an extension of the target classiﬁer: Revealdroid ∗. This
enhanced version of RevealDroid employs a pool of C4.5 trees
instead of relying on just one instance. Each classiﬁer in the pool
makes decisions based on different subsets of features present in
the feature vector, making it more robust against deliberate mod-
iﬁcations. Thus, each classiﬁer chooses its own subset of features
randomly at runtime. Therefore, a potential attacker has no evident
way of modifying the vector in order to evade all the classiﬁers at
once. The ﬁnal label assigned to a sample by this enhanced version
of RevealDroid results from majority voting. Our countermeasure
is inspired by those proposed by different authors in the literature.
The bagging (boosting and aggregating) approach has proven to
be effective in enhancing the robustness of classiﬁers in various
related problems ( Biggio et al., 2011; Perdisci, Gu, & Lee, 2006 ). 
Fig. 3 shows the architecture proposed for RevealDroid ∗ and
the whole schema for the countermeasure. The countermeasure
consists of measuring the level of agreement between Reveal-
Droid and RevealDroid ∗. When these two tools disagree, we con-
sider that an attacker achieved a potential evasion. RevealDroid ∗
must keep the same classiﬁer, training data and parameters as
RevealDroid , in order to generate similar outputs and reduce the
false alarm (or false positive) rate. However, for the triage process,
the priority is to reduce false negatives in order to guarantee that
an important sample is not misclassiﬁed as irrelevant. 
The feature extraction process of RevealDroid ∗ remains un-
changed, using the same feature vector for each app with a list of
API calls, intent actions and information ﬂows. Once the feature
vector is generated for each app, features are randomly partitioned
into a number of groups. That is, each feature is randomly as-
signed to one (and just one) group, guaranteeing that all groups
have the same number of features. The number of groups can be
manually tuned and also equals the number of classiﬁers (C4.5
in our case) used in the ensemble. Each classiﬁer is then trained
with all the instances using the subset of features allocated for it,
seeking to maximise the separation among labels in this reduced
feature space. 
The classiﬁcation process for a new malware sample with
RevealDroid ∗ is also outlined in Fig. 3 . Once again, the featureector is generated following the rules of RevealDroid . In a
econd step, the list of features is divided into groups depending
n the split previously performed when training the models. Each
nstance of the C4.5 algorithm delivers a label according to its
ortion of the feature space and a majority rule is applied to
btain the ﬁnal label for the input sample. 
The strength of RevealDroid ∗ lies in reducing the fragility of
 single-classiﬁer structure such as that of RevealDroid , in which
ust a simple change in the feature vector may lead to a classiﬁ-
ation error. When using multiple classiﬁers, the effort required to
chieve a successful evasion becomes considerably more complex
ince the attacker needs to evade the majority of the classiﬁers in
he ensemble. As a sanity check on RevealDroid ∗’s classiﬁcation
bility, we calculated its accuracy (see the plot at the bottom
f Fig. 6 ). The accuracy (88%) is similar to that of RevealDroid
75–91%). 
To evaluate the ability of the countermeasure to detect when a
ample has been altered so as to evade a correct classiﬁcation, we
ave used our attack to generate a representative set of apps suc-
essfully mutated, departing from, and trying to reach, all possible
amilies following the approach described in Section 2.5 . With
his procedure, a subset of more than 10,0 0 0 individuals were
uccessfully mutated. All these individuals were classiﬁed using
evealDroid ∗, yielding the results showed in Fig. 4 . Each series
n the ﬁgure is related to a speciﬁc conﬁguration of the genetic
lgorithm, where an increment of 1 means that it is possible to
enerate individuals with up to 30 changes in the feature vector,
hereas an increment of 0.6 reduces the number of changes to
round 1. The reasons for this relationship between the increment
arameter and the number of possible changes lies in the proba-
ility used internally by the genetic algorithm. Since every change
ust be manually injected into the application by the attacker, we
ay assume that in most cases the attacker would be interested
n applying the minimum number of changes needed to achieve
isclassiﬁcation as a different family. This situation is represented
y an increment equal to 0.6. In contrast, if the number of changes
s not an issue for the attacker, a higher value of this parame-
er can be considered. As Fig. 4 shows, the label delivered by
evealDroid ∗ differs considerably from the fake label pursued by
he attacker, thereby notifying of a potential classiﬁcation attack.
ith a maximum increment of 0.6 (around 1, 2 or 3 changes in-
ected), using 14 different classiﬁers RevealDroid ∗ will fail to de-
ect the attack in 0.9% of the cases (false negatives), which means
hat the evasion will be detected in 99.1% of the evaluations. 
The false positives of the countermeasure are computed by
valuating RevealDroid ∗ with RevealDroid ’s test data (this
ata has non-mutated fresh samples for RevealDroid and
evealDroid ∗). The level of disagreement is calculated using the
est output. Fig. 6 (top) shows that the false positive rate of our
ountermeasure ranges between 8% and 13.5%. Because the focus
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Fig. 4. False negative rates for the countermeasure with respect to the number of classiﬁers used in RevealDroid ∗ . 
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Fig. 6. False positive rate for the countermeasure (top) and accuracy of 
RevealDroid ∗ depending on the number of classiﬁers used in RevealDroid ∗ construc- 
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r  f the triage process is avoiding false negatives, we consider this
esult reasonable. 
.2. Reversing the attack 
Once a sample has been suspected as the result of a misclas-
iﬁcation attack, determining its original family is the next natural
tep. Reversing the transformation process that the attacker may
ave implemented is a complex task, particularly because of the
iﬃculty of differentiating between the original app behaviour and
he actions deliberately injected to cause the classiﬁcation error. 
However, the search process used during the attack offers the
eans to evaluate a number of possible original family classiﬁca-
ion candidates. The search was used between each possible pair
f families in order to evaluate the transition probabilities be-
ween them (as the number of individuals belonging to a speciﬁc
amily able to reach a target family divided by the total number of
ndividuals in the original family). The results of this experiment
re shown in Fig. 5 . The ﬁtness function used here is the one de-
cribed in Section 2.5 , which allows one to target speciﬁc families.
ince this matrix represents all possible transitions between orig-
nal malware samples of different families and mutated samples,
t is also possible to use this artefact to reveal the possible source
amilies of an application detected as misclassiﬁed. Furthermore, its also possible to order these candidate families by the transition
robabilities. 
For instance, Fig. 7 shows the probabilities of being the original
amily of a malware sample classiﬁed as Kmin family, according
o the corresponding row of Fig. 5 . In this example, there are
 potential source families in which all the individuals were
uccessfully mutated to be classiﬁed as Kmin, and these form a
et of 6 prospective original families. 
. Related work 
In this section we discuss the context for our work as it re-
ates to Android static analysis, adversarial machine learning and
ountermeasures. 
.1. Android static analysis 
Our work is focused on attacking a machine learning algo-
ithm which operates on a space generated by static analysis
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Fig. 7. Probabilities of being the origin family of a malware sample mutated to 
Kmin family. 
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t  features. We discuss the most relevant static analyses for our
work: permissions, API calls, intent actions and ﬂows. 
Permissions have been identiﬁed as potential signiﬁers of
malicious intentions. Tools like Kirim ( Enck, Ongtang, & McDaniel,
2009 ) were used to detect anomalous settings containing mali-
cious behaviour and tools like DroidRanger ( Zhou, Wang, Zhou, &
Jiang, 2012 ) leverage heuristics to perform the same task. API calls
can be used to detect malware and generate signatures, which is
the case for DroidLegacy ( Deshotels, Notani, & Lakhotia, 2014 )
and DroidAPIMiner ( Aafer, Du, & Yin, 2013 ). Current trends use
both ﬂow analysis, i.e. information leaks between data sources
and potentially malicious sinks, and intent actions, remote pro-
cedures where one application can use the privileges of another
one to perform malicious activities. Flows have been studied
using tools such as FlowDroid ( Arzt et al., 2014 ) and DroidSafe
( Gordon et al., 2015 ), while intents have been studied in different
ways: from the detection of communication vulnerabilities using
ComDroid ( Chin et al., 2011 ); to validation of the interaction
between components with Epicc ( Octeau et al., 2013 ); to points
to communication between objects in different applications us-
ing Amandroid ( Wei, Roy, & Ou, 2014 ); and to hybridization
these methods, as seen in DidFail ( Klieber, Flynn, Bhosale, Jia, &
Bauer, 2014 ) which hybridizes Epicc and FlowDroid to improve
detection through aggregated information. 
Other work, out of the scope of our analysis but also related to
static analysis for Android, uses a description language to identify
semantic-based signatures, such as Apposcopy ( Feng, Anand,
Dillig, & Aiken, 2014 ), or aims to detect the context that triggers
the malicious behaviour, such as AppContext ( Yang et al., 2015 )
and TriggerScope ( Fratantonio et al., 2016 ). 
In our work, we target techniques that use static analysis
features and leverage machine learning algorithms to detect or
classify malware. These techniques, provided in Table 1 , use the
previously discussed tools to extract feature vectors that feed a
machine learning algorithm. Tools like DroidSIFT ( Zhang, Duan,
Yin, & Zhao, 2014 ) and DroidAPIMiner ( Aafer et al., 2013 ) have
only been used for the detection problem, in which malware
and goodware must be discriminated, while tools like Dendroid
( Suarez-Tangil, Tapiador, Peris-Lopez, & Blasco, 2014 ), DroidLegacy
( Deshotels et al., 2014 ), Drebin ( Arp et al., 2014 ), DroidMiner
( Yang, Xu, Gu, Yegneswaran, & Porras, 2014 ) and RevealDroid
( Garcia et al., 2015 ) have also been used for family classiﬁcation,
with RevealDroid covering the largest spectrum in the feature
space. This was the main reason for choosing RevealDroid as the
targeted classiﬁer in our work. We also targeted the triage prob-em, which is closely related to the family classiﬁcation problem
s Lakhotia et al. state during the description of their tool VILO
 Lakhotia et al., 2013 ). This problem has also been examined from
 detection perspective using ranking based algorithms in MAST
 Chakradeo et al., 2013 ). Our goal here was to attack the triage
rocess using adversarial machine learning. 
.2. Adversarial machine learning 
Evasion and Adversarial Learning ( Huang, Joseph, Nelson,
ubinstein, & Tygar, 2011 ) are widely studied topics in both the
achine learning and computer security areas ( Barreno et al.,
006; Lowd & Meek, 2005; Ptacek & Newsham, 1998 ). Given the
uccess of machine learning techniques for addressing security
elated problems such as malware analysis, spam identiﬁcation,
r intrusion detection, testing the resilience and robustness of
hese approaches against an informed adversary is a necessary
ctivity. 
There is a wide spectrum of applications of machine learning
lgorithms in classiﬁcation problems. Their reliability is closely
inked to the reliability of the systems that depend on them.
dversarial learning is then an important problem that must be
ddressed. According to Barreno et al., the main weaknesses of
achine learning algorithms lie precisely in their adaptation abil-
ty, which can be exploited by attackers to cause deliberate errors
 Barreno, Nelson, Joseph, & Tygar, 2010 ). This presents a complex
ssue, since machine learning theory takes as its basis that the
raining dataset used in a learning process remains representative
f the problem domain and assumes intentionally harmful modi-
cations of the data do not happen ( Laskov & Lippmann, 2010 ). 
The problem of learning in hostile environments was ﬁrst
onsidered by Kearns and Li (1993) . In this work, the authors
eveloped an extension to Valiant’s Probably Approximately Correct
PAC) framework ( Valiant, 1984; 1985 ). The extension allows the
lgorithm to learn even when a dataset has been polluted with
rroneous data, introduced by an active adversary. This adversar-
al behaviour is modelled following a worst-case approach (i.e.,
nbounded computational power and access to the classiﬁcation
istory are assumed). The main contribution of this work was to
rovide methods to limit the maximum portion of the dataset
olluted by the adversary without having a negative effect on the
lassiﬁcation result. 
The proliferation of classiﬁcation and detection tools relying on
achine learning techniques has promoted an increased interest
n attacking these tools, taking advantage of the weaknesses in
lassiﬁcation algorithms. These attacks are very varied and depend
ainly on the adversarial model considered, since the capabilities
f the attacker and her knowledge about the classiﬁer deﬁne the
mpact of the attack. 
All these attacks against machine learning can be categorised by
oint of view. From a coarse perspective, the attacks can be classi-
ed in two categories: poisoning attacks ( Biggio, Nelson, & Laskov,
012 ) and evasion attacks ( Xu et al., 2016 ). In the former case, the
ttack is performed during the training stage. In this scenario the
dversary introduces fake or malformed data into the training set.
his will lead the classiﬁer to learn an inaccurate model and then
lassify further instances incorrectly. In the latter case, the attack
s performed during the classiﬁcation stage. The feature vector
elonging to a particular sample is modiﬁed so as to force the clas-
iﬁer to produce a wrong label. The proposed attack in this paper
alls in the evasion category as we try to fool an already trained
odel by distorting the feature vector of a particular sample. 
Barreno et al. (2006) provide an extended taxonomy of the dif-
erent attacks against machine learning applications. They model
ttack spaces using three key concepts: inﬂuence ( whether it affects
he training stage or the classiﬁcation itself ), speciﬁcity ( whether the
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ﬂttack tries to misdirect the classiﬁcation of data belonging to a par-
icular class or, alternatively, causes no discrimination to happen ) and
he security property violated by the attacker ( whether the attack
s against the classiﬁer’s availability or against the result’s integrity ). 
A practical example of how classiﬁcation algorithms can be suc-
essfully evaded is the classiﬁer-agnostic attack strategy described
y Biggio et al. for assessing the security of machine learning
pplications ( Biggio et al., 2013 ). They propose an adversarial
trategy based on gradient descent attacks. They consider different
hreat models depending on how much information the attacker
as regarding the attacked classiﬁer. The authors demonstrate
ow their strategy could be employed to evade classiﬁers such
s SVM and neural networks trained for detecting malicious PDF
les. 
In an approach similar to our own work but applied to a dif-
erent problem, Vigna, Robertson, and Balzarotti (2004) developed
 framework for measuring the resilience of a signature-based
etwork intrusion detection system (NIDS) against an adversary.
he authors employed mutation strategies for modifying known
xploits. Mutations were applied at network, application and code
evel, and included modifying the shape of network packets, inject-
ng malformed data, and hiding malicious code using polymorphic
ngines. Ten real world exploits were mutated using different
trategies and used to measure the resilience of two NIDS prod-
cts. The experiment conﬁrmed that evading the NIDS signatures is
easible, especially when combining different mutation techniques.
lthough this research has the injection of speciﬁc information
o provoke a malfunction in a detection system in common with
he attack that we describe in this paper, the problem varies
igniﬁcantly, since we are focused on malware classiﬁcation. 
Other research focused on NIDS was presented by
astrana et al. (2011) . It also takes advantage of genetic program-
ing, in this case as a search heuristic for ﬁnding modiﬁcation
outines capable of evading a particular NIDS. These modiﬁcation
outines take a malicious network packet as input and apply
ifferent adjustments (e.g.: changing a particular value within the
ata payload, altering the TCP header, etc.). The authors tested
he framework against C4.5 and Naïve–Bayes. By using this ge-
etic search, the authors obtained individuals able of inducing
on-negligible error rates in both classiﬁers, attaining a 37%
lassiﬁcation error rate in the Naïve–Bayes classiﬁer. In our work,
y contrast, we are ﬁnding modiﬁcations to evade a correct family
alware classiﬁcation, rather than evading its detection (thus
ssuming that the sample will still be detected as malware with
igh probability). 
Genetic programming has also been successfully employed in
ooling the detection of malicious code. In particular Xu et al.
resented EvadeML, a framework for automatically evading PDF
alware classiﬁers ( Xu et al., 2016 ). PDF ﬁles have been frequently
sed by attackers as hosts for embedded malware. The authors of
hat paper employed genetic search for ﬁnding the best modiﬁca-
ion strategy leading to evasion of detection by two PDF malware
etection systems (PDFrate and Hidost) built on top of machine
earning solutions. Up to 500 malicious payloads were successfully
vaded using the discovered strategies. Again, an evolutionary
lgorithm is used to evade detection rather than to evade a correct
lassiﬁcation between malware families. 
Another example of adversarial learning to evade the detection
f malicious PDF ﬁles is the mimicry attack ( Maiorca, Corona,
 Giacinto, 2013 ) that injects malicious code into a benign ﬁle
sing 3 different strategies: injecting an EXE (EXEembed), a PDF
PDFembed) or a Javascript (JSinject) payload. The evaluation of
hese tools shows high detection evasion effectiveness (100% for
XEembed and PDFembed and 80% for JSinject) on the 6 variants
enerated by the authors. Again, in contrast to our attack, this
esearch is not focused on re-shaping malware for evading aorrect classiﬁcation and the domain is different. The evasion of
DF detection has been extensively analysed in Laskov (2014) ,
emonstrating the vulnerabilities of a known online PDF analyser
o this kind of attacks. The interaction between malware families
as indeed been studied but from an unsupervised learning per-
pective, using clustering algorithms ( Biggio, Rieck et al., 2014 ).
ere, the authors inject new samples into the training process
ith the aim of disrupting the result. 
On the Android side, there are new evasion strategies which
im to attack machine learning ( Grosse, Papernot, Manoharan,
ackes, & McDaniel, 2016; Meng et al., 2016 ) and antivirus systems
 Aydogan & Sen, 2015; Meng et al., 2016; Xue et al., 2017; Zheng,
ee, & Lui, 2012 ). The ﬁrst technique in this area was ADAM
 Zheng et al., 2012 ), which manipulates malware via re-packing
nd obfuscation. ADAM was created to audit antivirus systems
nd it showed good effectiveness against VirusTotal, reaching
n evasion rate close to a 50%. In a similar line, Aydogan and
en (2015) include a genetic programming framework to the
bfuscation process, reporting an evasion effectiveness up to 33%
gainst 8 antivirus systems. The effectiveness of evasion strategies
as extended to new machine learning techniques, such as deep
earning, by Grosse et al. (2016) , who were able to reach up to
n 80% evasion rate by adding perturbations to the malware vari-
nts through junk code. This effective strategy was also followed
y Mystique ( Meng et al., 2016 ), and its extension, Mystique-S
 Xue et al., 2017 ). The former uses a multi-objective genetic
lgorithm to reduce the classiﬁcation rate of machine learning
lgorithms and anti-viruses, while it maximizes the attack be-
aviour; the later generates the code dynamically to reach the
ame goal. They are able to evade the detectors up to 80% of the
ime for Mystique and 94% of the time for Mystique-S. An interest-
ng case for evasion, out-of-the-box from the previous techniques,
as introduced by Vidas and Christin (2014) who generated an
ttack based on red pills, i.e., detecting environmental conditions.
his strategy combines the detection of behaviour, performance,
ardware and software components. They were able to reach an
6% evasion rate. Our tool, IagoDroid, is focused on attacking
he static analysis features of a machine learning classiﬁer, and
t is able to reach a 97% evasion rate. Compared with the other
elated tools of the state of the art, it is a competitive result (for a
ummary comparing all the above mentioned tools, see Table 2 . 
.3. Counteracting adversarial learning techniques 
The security community has worked both on testing classiﬁca-
ion systems built on top of machine learning techniques against
ifferent kinds of attacks and on designing countermeasures to
eal with this problem. For instance, Chinavle et al. studied the
ffect of em ploying learning ensembles for combatting adversaries
n a spam detection scenario ( Chinavle et al., 2009 ). Their approach
emonstrated that through the use of different classiﬁers, it is
ossible to detect performance degradation (due to evasion attacks
n behalf of a motivated adversary) and automatically repair this
ondition. Their approach allows the system to maintain a high
egree of accuracy through time while reducing the number of
e-training stages. 
Barreno et al. elaborated on the security and reliability of
achine learning ( Barreno et al., 2006 ), proposing a framework to
valuate the security of a particular machine learning application.
n the same line, Biggio, Fumera, and Roli (2014) proposed a
ramework to introduce countermeasures against attackers while
esigning the classiﬁer, instead of applying them later during
raining or test stages. The main contribution of this work is the
ack of bounds for a particular classiﬁer, making the framework
exible. 
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Table 2 
A comparison among different evasion methodologies related to IagoDroid, separated in general techniques and Android speciﬁc. 
Method Target Type of attack Evasion rate 
PDF and Network 
Pastrana ( Pastrana et al., 2011 ) C4.5 & Naïve Bayes Network injection 37% 
Vigna ( Vigna et al., 2004 ) Network intrusion detectors Mutation of exploits 90% 
Biggio ( Biggio et al., 2013 ) SVM & Nearest Neighbour Noise injection & Gradient Descent up to 100% 
EvadeMl ( Xu et al., 2016 ) PDFRate & Hidost Genetic Programming 90% 
EXEembed ( Maiorca et al., 2013 ) PDF malware detectors EXE payload embedding up to 100% 
PDFembed ( Maiorca et al., 2013 ) PDF malware detectors PDF embedding up to 100% 
JSinject ( Maiorca et al., 2013 ) PDF malware detectors Javascript embedding up to 80% 
Laskov ( Laskov, 2014 ) PDFRate Noise injection up to 72% 
Biggio ( Biggio, Rieck et al., 2014 ) Behavioural Clustering Data poisoning 76% 
Android 
Mystique ( Meng et al., 2016 ) Anti-virus & Machine Learning Code injection & Genetic Algorithms up to 80% 
Mystique-S ( Xue et al., 2017 ) Anti-virus Dynamic code generation 94% 
Vidas ( Vidas & Christin, 2014 ) Dynamic Analysis tools Red Pills 86% 
Grosse ( Grosse et al., 2016 ) Deep Learning Perturbation up to 80% 
ADAM ( Zheng et al., 2012 ) Anti-virus Re-packing and obfuscation up to 50% 
Aydogan ( Aydogan & Sen, 2015 ) Anti-virus Genetic Programming and Obfuscation up to 33% 
IagoDroid RevealDroid Code injection & Genetic Algorithms 97% 
Table 3 
Summary of experimental results. The table shows, for each malware family, the number of generations re- 
quired to ﬁnd a ﬁrst solution, the average number of generations required to achieve convergence, the average 
number of modiﬁcations, and the feature that is most frequently changed. 
Family First sol. Avg. conv. Avg. mod. Feature 
Plankton 1 3.3 1.0 ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED (0.7) 
GinMaster 1 3.7 1.0 SMS_MMS (0.6) 
Kmin 1 4.3 1.0 ACTION_USER_PRESENT (0.6) 
Glodream 1 4.7 0.8 ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED (0.4) 
BaseBridge Inf Inf – –
Nyleaker 1 3.6 1.0 NETWORK__LOG (0.4) 
Gappusin 1 3.4 0.9 ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED (0.3) 
Geinimi 1 3.9 1.0 NETWORK_INFORMATION (0.5) 
Imlog 1 4.7 1.2 ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED (0.7) 
DroidKungFu 1 7.2 0.7 IPC__NETWORK (0.2) 
Iconosys 1 3.5 1.1 NETWORK__LOG (0.3) 
Adrd 1 3.6 0.8 ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED (0.5) 
DroidDream 1 4.1 0.8 ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED (0.4) 
Dougalek 1 3.5 1.0 ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED (0.4) 
MobileTx 1 3.2 1.0 FILE (0.5) 
FakeInstaller 1 3.5 1.0 ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED (0.5) 
ExploitLinuxLotoor 1 2.1 0.8 ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED (0.4) 
Steek 1 3.9 1.0 ACTION_USER_PRESENT (0.4) 
Opfake 1 4.8 0.9 ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED (0.5) 
Nandrobox 1 3.2 1.0 ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED (0.4) 
Xsider 1 3.1 1.0 ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED (0.6) 
Yzhc 1 4.5 0.8 ACTION_USER_PRESENT (0.4) 
Fatakr 1 3.2 1.0 ACTION_USER_PRESENT (0.7) 
FakeRun 1 4.4 1.0 ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED (0.4) 
Mobilespy 1 3.1 0.9 ACTION_MAIN (0.4) 
Hamob 1 3.4 1.0 ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED (0.3) 
Jifake 1 2.6 0.8 android.net (0.3) 
Fakengry 1 2.6 0.6 UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER_DB_INFORMATION (0.2) 
SMSreg 1 1.6 0.9 ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED (0.3) 
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t  Dalvi et al. (2004) studied the development of robust classiﬁers.
They addressed the problem as a game between the attacker and
the target classiﬁer. In their approach, the attacker’s strategy is
used as input for generating a classiﬁer resilient to particular
adversarial behaviour. Addressing the problem from a game the-
oretical perspective, the authors improved the working of vanilla
Naïve–Bayes classiﬁer in a spam detection case, dramatically
reducing the number of errors. 
From a more general point of view, the effectiveness of dif-
ferent strategies that deal with evasion attacks has been studied
elsewhere. For instance, Support Vector Machines have been
evaluated ( Russu, Demontis, Biggio, Fumera, & Roli, 2016 ), con-
cluding that the selection of the kernel function is crucial. Feature
selection based countermeasures have been studied ( Budhraja &
Oates, 2015 ), showing that this can be counterproductive since it
reduces the accuracy of the classiﬁer in some cases. There is also framework focused on evaluating the potential attack scenarios
ue to the use of feature selection methods ( Xiao et al., 2015 ). 
Although the above countermeasures are able to successfully
arrow the effects produced by attacks on machine learning clas-
iﬁers, they are mainly focused on detection problems: a binary
lassiﬁcation between benign and malicious software. However,
 classiﬁcation task into different malware families constitutes a
ifferent scenario in which there can be an important number of
lasses closely located in the search space. 
. Conclusions 
IagoDroid demonstrates that any Android malware classiﬁcation
cheme that relies exclusively on static analysis during triage is a
ensitive process that can easily be destabilised. IagoDroid is able
o fool the RevealDroid classiﬁer into misclassifying the family for
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 8 out of 29 families in the dataset by modifying a single feature
f the original malware. In the process, this attack generates up to
4,0 0 0 new variants for 290 malware samples in just 2 min. 
As a countermeasure, we split the feature space into differ-
nt overlapping sets where different classiﬁers work together to
etect potential evasions. This method, named RevealDroid ∗, is
emonstrably effective for a small number of modiﬁcations but
ess useful when the number of modiﬁcations is high. In the
atter case, it is able to reduce the number of evasive variants
hat IagoDroid generates, but cannot prevent it from generating
t least some. In consequence, RevealDroid ∗ forces producers of
alware variants to ﬁnd techniques to modify a higher number
f features during the variants generation process. In the case
here an evasive ﬁle is detected, our countermeasure is also able
o track the original malware family, providing an opportunity to
econsider the malware priority during the triage process. 
This countermeasure shows some of the limitations of the
vasion method. The ﬁrst limitation is related to the adversarial
nvironment. IagoDroid has full knowledge of the underlying
lassiﬁer. This limits the possibility of having strong results in
ifferent scenarios, even when the technique may still be applica-
le. Another signiﬁcant limitation of the technique is in the ﬁnal
eneration of the variants, which in the current version requires
uman intervention to transform the suggested vector of changes
nto the actual variant. 
These limitations inspire several, possible lines of future work,
tarting from measuring the ability of IagoDroid to cause misclas-
iﬁcation in commercial tools, such as antivirus engines. This line
f research would require an extension to the tool’s capabilities
uch as providing automatic injection of changes within opaque
redicates. From a research perspective, IagoDroid is useful for
tudying the limitations on the robustness of machine learning
lassiﬁers and, indeed, our future work will focus on deﬁning
ound measures based on evasion abilities. This will help to un-
erstand which classiﬁcations algorithms are stronger than others
hen faced with adversaries for algorithms based on both static
nd dynamic analysis. Finally, the backtracking ability of our coun-
ermeasure can be understood as a Markov model among families
nd transitions. This knowledge can be used to study more deeply
he different relationships among Android malware families. 
cknowledgements 
This work has been supported by the following grants:
phemeCH ( MINECO TIN2014-56494-C4-4-P ) and CIBERDINE ( CM
2013/ICE-3095 ), both under the European Regional Develop-
ent Fund FEDER; SeMaMatch EP/K032623/1 and InfoTestSS
P/P006116/1 from EPSRC ; SPINY (MINECO TIN2013-46469-R) and
MOG-DEV (MINECO TIN2016-79095-C2-2-R) and Justice Pro- 
ramme of the European Union (2014-2020) 723180 – RiskTrack
JUST-2015-JCOO-AG/JUST-2015-JCOO-AG-1. The contents of this 
ublication are the sole responsibility of their authors and can in
o way be taken to reﬂect the views of the European Commission.
eferences 
afer, Y. , Du, W. , & Yin, H. (2013). Droidapiminer: Mining api-level features for ro-
bust malware detection in android. In International conference on security and
privacy in communication systems (pp. 86–103). Springer . 
rp, D. , Spreitzenbarth, M. , Hubner, M. , Gascon, H. , & Rieck, K. (2014). Drebin: Ef-
fective and explainable detection of android malware in your pocket.. Ndss . 
rzt, S. , Rasthofer, S. , Fritz, C. , Bodden, E. , Bartel, A. , Klein, J. , et al. (2014). Flowdroid:
Precise context, ﬂow, ﬁeld, object-sensitive and lifecycle-aware taint analysis for
android apps. ACM SIGPLAN Notices, 49 (6), 259–269 . 
ydogan, E. , & Sen, S. (2015). Automatic generation of mobile malwares using ge-
netic programming. In European conference on the applications of evolutionary
computation (pp. 745–756). Springer . arreno, M., Nelson, B., Joseph, A. D., & Tygar, J. D. (2010). The security of machine
learning. Machine Learning, 81 (2), 121–148. doi: 10.1007/s10994-010-5188-5 . 
arreno, M. , Nelson, B. , Sears, R. , Joseph, A. D. , & Tygar, J. D. (2006). Can machine
learning be secure? In Proceedings of the 2006 ACM symposium on information,
computer and communications security (pp. 16–25). ACM . 
iggio, B. , Corona, I. , Fumera, G. , Giacinto, G. , & Roli, F. (2011). Bagging classiﬁers
for ﬁghting poisoning attacks in adversarial classiﬁcation tasks. In International
workshop on multiple classiﬁer systems (pp. 350–359). Springer . 
iggio, B. , Corona, I. , Maiorca, D. , Nelson, B. , Šrndi ´c, N. , Laskov, P. , et al. (2013).
Evasion attacks against machine learning at test time. In Joint European con-
ference on machine learning and knowledge discovery in databases (pp. 387–402).
Springer . 
iggio, B. , Fumera, G. , & Roli, F. (2014). Security evaluation of pattern classiﬁers un-
der attack. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, 26 (4), 984–996 .
iggio, B. , Nelson, B. , & Laskov, P. (2012). Poisoning attacks against support vector
machines. In Proceedings of the 29th international conference on machine learning,
ICML 2012, Edinburgh, Scotland, Uk, June 26 - July 1, 2012 . 
iggio, B. , Rieck, K. , Ariu, D. , Wressnegger, C. , Corona, I. , Giacinto, G. , et al. (2014).
Poisoning behavioral malware clustering. In Proceedings of the 2014 workshop on
artiﬁcial intelligent and security workshop (pp. 27–36). ACM . 
udhraja, K. K. , & Oates, T. (2015). Adversarial feature selection. In 2015 IEEE inter-
national conference on data mining workshop (ICDMW) (pp. 288–294). IEEE . 
hakradeo, S. , Reaves, B. , Traynor, P. , & Enck, W. (2013). Mast: triage for market-scale
mobile malware analysis. In Proceedings of the sixth ACM conference on security
and privacy in wireless and mobile networks (pp. 13–24). ACM . 
hin, E. , Felt, A. P. , Greenwood, K. , & Wagner, D. (2011). Analyzing inter-application
communication in android. In Proceedings of the 9th international conference on
mobile systems, applications, and services (pp. 239–252). ACM . 
hinavle, D. , Kolari, P. , Oates, T. , & Finin, T. (2009). Ensembles in adversarial classi-
ﬁcation for spam. In Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on information and
knowledge management (pp. 2015–2018). ACM . 
alvi, N. , Domingos, P. , Sanghai, S. , & Verma, D. (2004). Adversarial classiﬁcation.
In Proceedings of the tenth ACM SIGKDD international conference on knowledge
discovery and data mining (pp. 99–108). ACM . 
ash, S. K. , Suarez-Tangil, G. , Khan, S. , Tam, K. , Ahmadi, M. , Kinder, J. , et al. (2016).
Droidscribe: Classifying android malware based on runtime behavior. In Mobile
security technologies (MoST 2016) (pp. 1–12) . 7kearns1993learning148 
eshotels, L. , Notani, V. , & Lakhotia, A. (2014). Droidlegacy: Automated familial clas-
siﬁcation of android malware. In Proceedings of ACM SIGPLAN on program protec-
tion and reverse engineering workshop 2014 (p. 3). ACM . 
nck, W. , Ongtang, M. , & McDaniel, P. (2009). On lightweight mobile phone appli-
cation certiﬁcation. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on computer and
communications security (pp. 235–245). ACM . 
eng, Y. , Anand, S. , Dillig, I. , & Aiken, A. (2014). Apposcopy: Semantics-based de-
tection of android malware through static analysis. In Proceedings of the 22nd
ACM SIGSOFT international symposium on foundations of software engineering
(pp. 576–587). ACM . 
ratantonio, Y., Bianchi, A., Robertson, W., Kirda, E., Kruegel, C., & Vigna, G. (2016).
Triggerscope: Towards detecting logic bombs in android applications. In 2016
IEEE symposium on security and privacy (SP) (pp. 377–396). doi: 10.1109/SP.2016.
30 . 
andotra, E. , Bansal, D. , & Sofat, S. (2014). Malware analysis and classiﬁcation: A
survey. Journal of Information Security, 5 (02), 56 . 
arcia, J. , Hammad, M. , Pedrood, B. , Bagheri-Khaligh, A. , & Malek, S. (2015). Obfus-
cation-resilient, eﬃcient, and accurate detection and family identiﬁcation of an-
droid malware. Technical Report . Department of Computer Science, George Ma-
son University . 
ordon, M. I. , Kim, D. , Perkins, J. H. , Gilham, L. , Nguyen, N. , & Rinard, M. C. (2015).
Information ﬂow analysis of android applications in droidsafe.. NDSS . Citeseer . 
rosse, K., Papernot, N., Manoharan, P., Backes, M., & McDaniel, P. (2016). Adver-
sarial perturbations against deep neural networks for malware classiﬁcation.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.04435 
uang, L. , Joseph, A. D. , Nelson, B. , Rubinstein, B. I. , & Tygar, J. (2011). Adversarial
machine learning. In Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on security and artiﬁ-
cial intelligence (pp. 43–58). ACM . 
earns, M. , & Li, M. (1993). Learning in the presence of malicious errors. SIAM Jour-
nal on Computing, 22 (4), 807–837 . 
lieber, W. , Flynn, L. , Bhosale, A. , Jia, L. , & Bauer, L. (2014). Android taint ﬂow anal-
ysis for app sets. In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGPLAN international workshop
on the state of the art in java program analysis (pp. 1–6). ACM . 
abs, M. (2016). McAfee labs threats report. http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/
reports/rp-quarterly- threats- may- 2016.pdf . [Online; Accessed 19.07.2016]. 
akhotia, A . , Walenstein, A . , Miles, C. , & Singh, A. (2013). Vilo: A rapid learning
nearest-neighbor classiﬁer for malware triage. Journal of Computer Virology and
Hacking Techniques, 9 (3), 109–123 . 
askov, P., & Lippmann, R. (2010). Machine learning in adversarial environments.
Machine Learning, 81 (2), 115–119. doi: 10.1007/s10994- 010- 5207- 6 . 
askov, P. (2014). Practical evasion of a learning-based classiﬁer: A case study. In
2014 IEEE symposium on security and privacy (pp. 197–211). IEEE . 
owd, D. , & Meek, C. (2005). Adversarial learning. In Proceedings of the eleventh
ACM SIGKDD international conference on knowledge discovery in data mining
(pp. 641–647). ACM . 
aiorca, D. , Corona, I. , & Giacinto, G. (2013). Looking at the bag is not enough to
ﬁnd the bomb: An evasion of structural methods for malicious pdf ﬁles detec-
tion. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSAC symposium on information, computer
and communications security (pp. 119–130). ACM . 
126 A. Calleja et al. / Expert Systems With Applications 95 (2018) 113–126 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W  
 
 
X  
 
 
X  
X  
 
Y  
 
 
Y  
 
 
Z  
 
 
 
 
Z  
Z  
 Meng, G. , Xue, Y. , Mahinthan, C. , Narayanan, A. , Liu, Y. , Zhang, J. , et al. (2016). Mys-
tique: Evolving android malware for auditing anti-malware tools. In Proceed-
ings of the 11th ACM on Asia conference on computer and communications security
(pp. 365–376). ACM . 
Octeau, D. , McDaniel, P. , Jha, S. , Bartel, A. , Bodden, E. , Klein, J. , et al. (2013). Effective
inter-component communication mapping in android: An essential step towards
holistic security analysis. In Presented as part of the 22nd USENIX security sym-
posium (USENIX security 13) (pp. 543–558) . 
Pastrana, S. , Orﬁla, A. , & Ribagorda, A. (2011). A functional framework to evade net-
work ids. In System sciences (HICSS), 2011 44th Hawaii international conference
on (pp. 1–10). IEEE . 
Perdisci, R. , Gu, G. , & Lee, W. (2006). Using an ensemble of one-class SVM classi-
ﬁers to harden payload-based anomaly detection systems. In Sixth international
conference on data mining (ICDM’06) (pp. 4 88–4 98). IEEE . 
Ptacek, T. H. , & Newsham, T. N. (1998). Insertion, evasion, and denial of service:
Eluding network intrusion detection. Technical Report . DTIC Document . 
Rasthofer, S. , Arzt, S. , & Bodden, E. (2014). A machine-learning approach for classi-
fying and categorizing android sources and sinks.. NDSS . 
Russu, P. , Demontis, A. , Biggio, B. , Fumera, G. , & Roli, F. (2016). Secure kernel ma-
chines against evasion attacks. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM workshop on arti-
ﬁcial intelligence and security (pp. 59–69). ACM . 
Sivanandam, S. , & Deepa, S. (2007). Introduction to genetic algorithms . Springer Sci-
ence & Business Media . 
Suarez-Tangil, G. , Tapiador, J. E. , Peris-Lopez, P. , & Blasco, J. (2014). Dendroid: A text
mining approach to analyzing and classifying code structures in android mal-
ware families. Expert Systems with Applications, 41 (4), 1104–1117 . 
Valiant, L. G. (1984). A theory of the learnable. Communications of the ACM, 27 (11),
1134–1142 . 
Valiant, L. G. (1985). Learning disjunction of conjunctions.. In IJCAI (pp. 560–566) . 
Vidas, T. , & Christin, N. (2014). Evading android runtime analysis via sandbox de-
tection. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM symposium on information, computer and
communications security (pp. 447–458). ACM . 
Vigna, G. , Robertson, W. , & Balzarotti, D. (2004). Testing network-based intrusion
detection signatures using mutant exploits. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM con-
ference on computer and communications security (pp. 21–30). ACM . ei, F. , Roy, S. , & Ou, X. (2014). Amandroid: A precise and general inter-component
data ﬂow analysis framework for security vetting of android apps. In Proceed-
ings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC conference on computer and communications security
(pp. 1329–1341). ACM . 
iao, H. , Biggio, B. , Brown, G. , Fumera, G. , Eckert, C. , & Roli, F. (2015). Is feature se-
lection secure against training data poisoning?. In F. Bach, & D. Blei (Eds.), JMLR
W&CP-proceedings of the 32nd international conference on international conference
on machine learning (ICML): Vol. 37 (pp. 1689–1698) . 
u, W. , Qi, Y. , & Evans, D. (2016). Automatically evading classiﬁers. In Proceedings of
the 2016 network and distributed systems symposium . 
ue, Y. , Meng, G. , Liu, Y. , Tan, T. H. , Chen, H. , Sun, J. , & Zhang, J. (2017). Auditing an-
ti-malware tools by evolving android malware and dynamic loading technique.
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 12 (7), 1529–1544 . 
ang, C. , Xu, Z. , Gu, G. , Yegneswaran, V. , & Porras, P. (2014). Droidminer: Au-
tomated mining and characterization of ﬁne-grained malicious behaviors in
android applications. In European symposium on research in computer security
(pp. 163–182). Springer . 
ang, W. , Xiao, X. , Andow, B. , Li, S. , Xie, T. , & Enck, W. (2015). Appcontext:
Differentiating malicious and benign mobile app behaviors using context. In
2015 IEEE/ACM 37th IEEE international conference on software engineering: Vol. 1
(pp. 303–313). IEEE . 
hang, M. , Duan, Y. , Yin, H. , & Zhao, Z. (2014). Semantics-aware android malware
classiﬁcation using weighted contextual api dependency graphs. In Proceedings
of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC conference on computer and communications security
(pp. 1105–1116). ACM . 
Zheng, M. , Lee, P. P. , & Lui, J. C. (2012). Adam: an automatic and extensible platform
to stress test android anti-virus systems. In International conference on detection
of intrusions and malware, and vulnerability assessment (pp. 82–101). Springer . 
hou, Y. , & Jiang, X. (2012). Dissecting android malware: Characterization and evo-
lution. In 2012 IEEE symposium on security and privacy (pp. 95–109). IEEE . 
hou, Y. , Wang, Z. , Zhou, W. , & Jiang, X. (2012). Hey, you, get off of my market:
Detecting malicious apps in oﬃcial and alternative android markets. In NDSS:
Vol. 25 (pp. 50–52) . 
